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JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY. By Susan Moller Okin. New 
York: Basic Books. 1989. Pp. viii, 216. $19.95. 
Many of the most important institutions in the United States pur-
port to be dedicated to maintaining a ''just" society.1 For instance, the 
"criminal justice" system is designed to ensure that all people are 
treated fairly, and that only the guilty are "brought to justice." In her 
book Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Moller Okin2 observes 
that justice is glaringly lacking from one of the cornerstone institu-
tions of American life: the family. 
Okin argues that "marriage and the family, as currently practiced 
in our society, are unjust institutions. They constitute the pivot of a 
societal system of gender that renders women vulnerable to depen-
dency, exploitation, and abuse" {pp. 135-36). Not all families are un-
just, but most fall into traps which render them so. For instance, 
women who forgo careers for the good of their families often become 
economically dependent on their husbands. 3 This dependency causes 
women to fear divorce and permits men to dominate family decision-
making. Because society as a whole, which shapes individual beliefs, 
overemphasizes money and undervalues children, the ability of the 
husband to make truly just family decisions is impaired, if not elimi-
nated. When women seek work outside the home, the justness of fam-
ily decisions does not change, due to a tendency to burden women 
with more family responsibilities than men.4 Injecting violence into 
the relationship only further skews the balance of power and decision-
making in favor of husbands, again at the expense of justice {pp. 128-
29, 152). These are some of the basic, well-reasoned arguments Okin 
1. Any precise definition of ''.just" or ''.justice" is, rather patently, far beyond the scope of this 
piece. The reference is only to justice in its vaguest (and hopefully unexceptionable) sense. Okin 
describes "theories of justice" as being "centrally concerned with whether, how, and why persons 
should be treated differently from one another." P. 8. She does not define justice in a way that 
can be neatly summarized in a sentence, or a footnote for that matter. Careful attention must be 
paid to everyone's point of view. In general, in Okin's view, a just society would work to equalize 
people's situations. For instance, people should be treated alike, unless their social "power" 
differed, requiring different treatment. 
2. Okin is a Professor of Politics at Brandeis University. She is the author of WOMBN JN 
WESTERN PoLmCAL THOUGHT (1979) and numerous articles including: Justice and Gender, 16 
PHIL. & PUB . .AFF. 42 (1987); The Moral Acceptability of Nuclear Dete"ence: A Critique, PoL., 
Nov. 1983, at 16; Philosopher Queens and Private Wives: Plato on Women and the Family, 6 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 345 (1977); "The Soveraign and His Counsel/ours'': Hobbes's Reevaluation of 
Parliament, 10 POL. THEORY 49 (1982); Taking the Bishops Seriously, 36 WORLD POL. 527 
(1984); Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 65 (1982); 
Rousseau's Natural Woman, 14 J. POL. 393 (1979). 
3. Pp. 146-47; see also Law, Women, Work. Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 
U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1317 (1983). 
4. Pp. 153-55; see also Law, supra note 3, at 1330-31. 
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uses to support her theory tl~at the traditional family structure is 
unjust. 
The family's structure has an impact well beyond the relationship 
between husbands and wives. Okin stresses repeatedly that children 
cannot learn to be just if their major unit for learning about justice -
the family - is unjust. Unjust children grow into unjust adults, likely 
to continue the pattern of injustice within the family through their 
own children. Another effect of family structure is its impact on who 
holds political power. Public decisionmakers are likely to be "men 
who, if fathers, have minimal contact with their children, or women 
who have either forgone motherhood altogether or hired others as full-
time caretakers for their children because of the demands of their ca-
reers. "5 Therefore, Okin argues, people not intimately involved with 
the family are making important policy decisions about abortion, child 
care, and other issues that affect the family. 
Despite the lack of justice in one of society's fundamental institu-
tions, and the corresponding reverberations throughout society, major 
theories of justice have largely ignored the problem. This is the major 
thrust of the book. Okin wonders, "Why is it that when we tum to 
contemporary theories of justice, we do not find illuminating and posi-
tive contributions to this question?" (p. 8). For instance, John Rawls 
initially includes the family in his definition of the sphere of social 
justice, 6 but ignores it throughout the remainder of the theory, 
although he assumes its existence (p. 93). Thus, theorists assume the 
traditional gendered family will continue to exist even in their new 
utopias (pp. 8-10). Okin asserts this is why women and the family 
have not been included in theories of justice. Moreover, by using lan-
guage which is falsely gender neutral, 7 the inapplicability of the theo-
ries to women in traditional gendered families is masked. 
Within this framework, Okin criticizes the failures of a number of 
5. P. 179. A study of women who work for large law firms is one example of this phenome-
non. "After years of trying to fit a stereotype, many women in private firms concluded that it 
was simply not possible to run a household, raise children and bill 2,000 hours, and they either 
dropped out or sought legal work traditionally deemed appropriate for women." Kaye, Women 
Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gender Equality, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. '111, 
120 (1988) (citing J. ABRAMSON & B. FRANKLIN, WHERE THEY ARE Now: THE STORY OF 
THE WOMEN OF HARVARD LAW 1974 (1986)). A more recent study of students and graduates 
of Stanford Law School supports a continuing expectation that women will continue to be the 
primary caretakers of their children. Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: 
An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209, 1256-59 
(1988). 
6. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971) (the monogamous family is but one of the 
major social institutions which are the primary subjects of justice). 
7. Gender neutral language discards the exclusive use of the "generic" or "universal" male 
forms of words. Okin calls language falsely gender neutral if it is merely superficial tolerance of 
feminist challenges, "ignoring the irreducible biological differences between the sexes, and/or by 
ignoring their different assigned social roles and consequent power differentials, and the ideolo-
gies that have supported them." P. 11. 
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contemporary theories of justice. For instance, while Michael 
Walzer's Spheres of Justice 8 addresses the issue of gender and uses 
gender-neutral language, his theory ultimately fails to address ade-
quately gender justice. Walzer relies on" 'shared understandings' as a 
criterion for justice. " 9 Walzer defines shared understandings as the 
"social meaning," or the value that society as a whole places on a 
good. For instance, modem U.S. society shares the belief that higher 
education should be awarded on the basis of merit, not money, and 
our concept of what is just will include this belief. Okin describes at 
length how "shared understandings" do not actually exist, and how 
most concepts which can be considered "shared" are really the result 
of domination by the most powerful class or sex. 10 
Contrary to Walzer's theory of shared understandings, in fact, oppres-
sors and oppressed ... often disagree fundamentally. Oppressors often 
claim that they, aristocrats or Brahmins or men, are fully human in ways 
that serfs or untouchables or women are not . . . . But what if the serfs 
or untouchables or women somehow do become convinced ... that they 
are fully human ... ? [p. 67] 
If this consciousness raising were to occur, then the "shared under-
standing" of inferiority would no longer exist. 
Although Okin finds Walzer's theory of justice inadequate, she ac-
knowledges that elements of it remain useful. For example, Okin finds 
Walzer's overall theory that "separate spheres hav[e] to allow for dif-
ferent inequalities to exist side by side only insofar as ... 'dominance' 
is not created," useful as a tool to point out the inequities of gender-
structured society (p. 112). 
Like Walzer's theory, Rawls' theory of justice shares some of the 
basic problems Okin attributes to the majority of contemporary theo-
ries. First, he uses terms which are supposedly generic - men, man-
kind, he, his - but really refer to males. "A feminist reader finds it 
difficult not to keep asking, Does this theory of just apply to women?" 
(p. 91). Also, in developing his theory, Rawls assumes the gendered 
family, 11 but does not discuss whether the family itself is just. Okin 
notes, 
In fact, apart from passing references, the family appears in A Theory of 
Justice in only three contexts: as the link between generations necessary 
for the just savings principle; as an obstacle to fair equality of opportu-
nity (on account of the inequalities among families); and as the first 
8. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). 
9. P. 112. M. WALZER, supra note 8, at xv, 312 (rights "follow from shared conceptions of 
social goods" and "[J1ustice is relative to social meanings"). 
10. Okin is not the first to criticize Walzer on this point. See, e.g., Dworkin, To Each His 
Own (Book Review), N.Y. Rev. of Books, Apr. 14, 1983, at 4 (1983); Fishkin, Defending Equal-
ity: A View from the Cave (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. REv. 755 (1984); Mulleniz, The Limits of 
"Complex Equality" (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REv. 1801, 1806 (1984); Sadurski, Conven-
tional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REv. 339, 386-88 (1987). 
11. See supra note 7. 
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school of moral development. 12 
At no point does Rawls subject the family to the same moral examina-
tion as other social institutions (p. 97). 
These failings do not obscure, for Okin, the brilliance of Rawls' 
concept. In Rawls' theory of justice, social institutions are con-
structed by people (heads offamilies) ignorant of their place in society. 
Because these people do not know their sex, race and other criteria 
typically used to discriminate, they are less likely to adopt discrimina-
tory standards out of fear they will be the victim, rather than the bene-
factor, of such standards. Okin calls this "a powerful concept for 
challenging the gender structure" (p. 109). Within this framework, 
for instance, the traditional gender roles in the family, such as the 
expectation that women will perform most domestic functions regard-
less of their other commitments, will not be perpetuated because the 
person establishing this standard cannot be certain that "he" is not 
really a "she." In this sense, Rawls' theory remains useful. 
While Okin partially redeems Walzer and Rawls, she directs much 
harsher criticism toward the viewpoint expressed by the darling of the 
conservatives, Allen Bloom. Bloom's The Closing of the American 
Mind 13 has received much attention (and criticism) for its suggestion 
that American society is collapsing due to its failure to educate the 
young elite (p. 34), but Okin has a different point of contention. 
Bloom accepts the injustice of the family as necessary, and even argues 
that feminism is "not founded on nature," defying as it does women's 
natural biological destiny. 14 Rather, Bloom asserts, men are naturally 
selfish, and women are ruining the traditional family and society by 
becoming more selfish themselves. 15 Ultimately, Okin attacks Bloom 
as an aristocrat who never defines the terms he relies on, such as what 
is the "natural" order of things, in his attack on egalitarianism.16 Ac-
cordingly, she dismisses Bloom's views as inherently inconsistent with 
the necessary establishment of the egalitarian family. 
As ridiculous as Bloom's ideas may appear to a feminist, presuma-
bly he is not alone in his thinking. The very existence of systemic 
injustice in the family alone may indicate some support for Bloom's 
beliefs. The dearth of critiques of the antifeminist component of his 
thesis further suggests some popularity of his views. 17 And yet, rather 
12. P. 94. Okin argues this assumption is unwarranted given Rawls' argument. 
13. A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987). 
14. P. 34 (citing A. BLOOM, supra note 13, at 38, 99-100). 
15. P. 37 (quoting A. BLOOM, supra note 13, at 129). 
16. Pp. 37-39 ("Most of the time, it is difficult to discern any consistent meaning in Bloom's 
references to 'the natural,' except that it is whatever preserves the dominance of the white male 
elite and enables its members, by philosophizing, to come to terms with their own mortality." P. 
38). 
17. Other than Okin, only one reviewer seems to have taken issue with Bloom for his an-
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than offer a coherent response, Okin chooses to dismiss blithely 
Bloom's viewpoint. 
Okin is similarly blithe in her prescription of a response to the in-
justice of the family. She proposes legislating the egalitarian family 
into existence by, for example, requiring men to support their children 
(pp. 39-40). Okin's insistence seems naive, at best. Changing the law 
is not always the best answer to every social situation. Indeed, current 
laws already require men to support their children. 18 Compliance is 
generally lax, and society has proved unwilling to enforce these laws 
vigorously.19 Okin does not address this issue adequately because she 
fails to show how further changes in the law will change underlying 
attitudes in a way that the existing laws have not done, and in a way 
that justice requires. This is but one example of how Justice, Gender, 
and the Family consistently preaches to the converted instead of ade-
quately attempting to convert.20 
While the central premise of Okin's book is that the family is un-
just, and society is in large part to blame, she fails to recognize the 
current limitations of society on her own solutions. Just as those she 
criticizes ignore the family, she ignores the traditionalists. The most 
telling example of this is in her conclusion. Okin devotes only the last 
chapter of the book (pp. 170-86) exclusively to her own theory. She 
proposes making the family more just in two ways. The first is to 
move away from strictly defined gender roles within the family, and 
within society (pp. 175-80). The second is to protect those who are 
made vulnerable by accepting traditional societal roles (pp. 180-83). 
While these are logical and useful suggestions, Okin does not fully de-
velop them. 
More importantly, Okin offers no suggestion for overcoming the 
attitudes of current adults or children. Assuming a just family will 
create just children who will believe in and act out the equality of the 
sexes, how do we create a just family in the first place? Okin's only 
suggestions are increasing the availability of day care (p. 175) and re-
quiring businesses to make jobs more flexible to adapt to parenting 
needs (pp. 175-80). Certainly, these changes would make it easier for 
tifeminism. See Nussbaum, Undemocratic Vistas (Book Review), N.Y. REv. OF BooKS, Nov. S, 
1987, at 20. 
18. E.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-48S, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (establish-
ing federal minimum child support laws); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, n SOS (1988); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § SS2.602 (West 1988). 
19. According to Census Bureau statistics, 1,138,000 women, approximately 26% of those 
owed child support, were not paid any of the child support owed to them in 198S. BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
1989 368 (Table No. 609) (109th ed. 1989). 
20. Rawls argues that in order to establish justice as fairness, a consensus needs to be 
reached. Therefore, "justification is not regarded simply as valid argument from listed premises, 
even should these premises be true. Rather, justification is addressed to others who disagree with 
us ..•. " Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 14 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 223, 229 (198S). 
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both parents to work. But how long would these structures have to be 
in place before they would change prevailing attitudes? Would they 
make men any more likely to make dinner or do the laundry? Or 
would they simply be seen as a government commitment to children, 
possibly hostile to the traditional family?21 How would private busi-
nesses react to the prospect of losing their "best" workers to their chil-
dren? Could the government force companies to change their policies 
without excessively burdening employers' ability to make business de-
cisions? These are but a few of the questions which follow from Okin's 
suggestions. 
Unfortunately, Okin does not provide answers to these questions, 
or many others. Her response to critics is essentially a dismissal, con-
tained in one paragraph on the last page of the book: 
For those whose response to what I have argued here is the practical 
objection that it is unrealistic and will cost too much, I have some an-
swers and some questions. Some of what I have suggested would not 
cost anything, in terms of public spending, though it would redistribute 
the costs and other responsibilities of rearing children more evenly be-
tween men and women. Some policies I have endorsed, such as adequate 
public support for children whose fathers cannot contribute, may cost 
more than present policies, but may not, depending on how well they 
work. Some, such as subsidized high-quality day care, would be expen-
sive in themselves, but also might soon be offset by other savings, since 
they would enable those who would otherwise be full-time child carers to 
be at least part-time workers. [p. 186] 
Because Okin does not address the possible shortcomings in her 
work, she weakens the impact of an otherwise powerful concept. 
While developing her theory and adding more depth may have made 
the book more difficult to read,22 the theory itself would have become 
more convincing. Thus, as a critique of others' political theories, 
Okin's book clearly succeeds, but as a call for change it does not offer 
enough. 
- Christine A. Pagac 
21. This response would not be entirely novel. For instance, President Nixon vetoed a bill 
which would have expanded the availability of child care "on the grounds that such expanded 
day care would undermine the role of the family in American society." Law, supra note 3, at 
1311. 
22. In the introduction, Okin mentions her desire to create an easy-to-read book. P. vii. She 
succeeds, but at the cost of her theory. 
